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Chapter 12
Making Savers Winners: An Overview
of Prize-Linked Saving Products
Melissa S. Kearney, Peter Tufano, Jonathan Guryan,
and Erik Hurst

Policy initiatives aimed at increasing household saving rates typically focus
on things like mandating saving, changing the choice architecture of saving
decisions, providing financial incentives, or embedding saving in a social
network.1 In this chapter, we review an alternative policy option: prizelinked saving (PLS) accounts. This mechanism adds a lottery-like feature to
an otherwise standard saving account, creating an asset structure that
might hold great appeal to the target low-saver segment of the population.
While PLS accounts would be innovative in the United States, such accounts have already proven to be popular in other countries. In addition,
such accounts are potentially a more cost-effective way of promoting saving
compared to matching accounts or policies that use financial incentives to
motivate saving behavior. The primary obstacle to the widespread adoption
and offering of PLS accounts in the United States is the questionable
legality of such products, which we discuss later.
PLS accounts differ from standard saving accounts in one specific way.
Instead of, or perhaps in addition to, offering a fixed interest return, PLS
accounts offer a stochastic return in that depositors periodically receive a
chance to win a specified (and potentially large) amount that is a function
of deposit amounts. In this sense, this chance is similar to a lottery ticket.
The products are unlike a traditional lottery in that the principal is returned to the investor, either at the maturity of the instrument or on
demand. The random component of the return on saving can take the
form of in-kind prizes—as is commonly offered by commercial banks in
Latin America—or as a cash prize awarded to account holders as a part of a
regular drawing, as is the case with Britain’s Premium Bonds.
There are two features of PLS accounts that would likely be attractive to
potential savers. First, they offer a skewed distribution of returns. Many
potential investors desire some exposure to upside risk (i.e., a chance to be
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rich). Second, to the extent that they offer a lottery-like component, PLS
accounts potentially offer an element of entertainment or fun.
We present three pieces of existing indirect evidence in support of the
view that PLS products would be popular among low- and moderateincome households in the United States. First, the propensity of many
low- and middle-income US families to gamble on state lotteries indirectly
suggests that a saving vehicle offering a low probability chance of a high
payoff prize would be an attractive asset, particularly among low- and
middle- income investors. Second, PLS assets are popular in several other
countries and have been popular for over three centuries. Third, two
recent PLS demonstration experiments in the United States show
promising initial results in terms of consumer take-up. There is an important caveat to interpreting this evidence on the popularity of PLS products:
to date, there is no evidence on the fundamental issue of whether these
products increase total household saving. This remains an important question for future research.2

The appeal of PLS accounts
A consensus has emerged among academics and policymakers that traditional vehicles for increasing saving, including IRAs and 401(k)s, are not
generally successful at raising saving by individuals at the lower end of the
wealth distribution. Recent initiatives such as the Saver’s Credit and Individual Development Accounts, which use matching funds as an additional
enticement to save, are promising but require substantial government
financial support (Tufano and Schneider, 2008).
The promotion of PLS products takes seriously the idea that potential
savers place a high value on the chance to ‘win big’. We speculate that there
is unmet consumer demand in America for saving products that offer the
(remote) prospect of changing current wealth status, rather than incrementally building wealth with certainty. If this speculation is correct, then
an otherwise standard investment vehicle offering a financial return in the
form of a chance to win a large prize, rather than a guaranteed modest
return, would be an even more effective way to motivate individuals to
contribute current income to investment accounts than schemes such as
contribution matching. Furthermore, the lottery component of the PLS
account might have direct appeal beyond the chance to win large prizes.
For those who consider playing the lottery to be fun, a saving account with a
lottery component may be more attractive than a standard saving account
with stable returns.
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The potential appeal of PLS accounts to US households
A fundamental policy question behind a PLS policy is whether observed
preferences for uncertain payoffs could be leveraged to encourage saving.
Our conjecture that it could is based on two sets of observations. The
experience of lottery gambling in the United States demonstrates that
there is widespread demand for low-probability, high-prize gambling products, in particular among low-income individuals and households. In the
year 2008, forty-two states and the District of Columbia offered state lotteries, bringing in roughly $60 billion in sales or more than $540 per
household nationwide (NASPL, 2010). In the same year, American households spent $430 per household on all dairy products, and $444 on alcohol
(BLS, 2010). We buy more lottery tickets than milk or beer.
Lottery gambling is also popular among US low- and moderate-income
households. The 1998 National Opinion Research Council (NORC) survey
of gambling, the most recent nationally representative survey of gambling
behavior in the United States, reveals three general facts (Kearney, 2005).
First, lottery gambling extends across races, sexes, income, and education
groups. Second, with regard to race, black respondents spend nearly twice
as much on lottery tickets as do white and Hispanic respondents, and the
highest rates of participation and expenditures are recorded among black
male high school dropouts. Third, average annual lottery spending in
dollar terms is roughly equal across the lowest, middle, and highest income
groups. This implies that on average, low-income households spend a
larger percentage of their wealth on lottery tickets than other US households.3
Much has been written about potential explanations for gambling
among consumers. The case of state lottery gambling is particularly interesting to consider because state lottery tickets offer a negative expected
return. On average, state lotteries offer a (negative) return of roughly
52 cents on the dollar (La Fleur and La Fleur, 2001). Given such a large
negative return, why do more than half of American adults participate in
lottery gambling? There are numerous possible explanations. Many casual
observers associate lottery gambling with misinformation or confusion on
the part of lottery gamblers. The choice to buy lottery tickets need not be a
mistake, however. Traditional economic consumer choice theory would
permit such gambles among risk-averse consumers, if these consumers
received sufficient entertainment value from gambling or utility from
giving in this way to a charity, since most states use the money for education
or other public goods. Behavioral economists offer as a possible explanation that lottery gamblers overweight the small probabilities associated with
winning.
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Another possible explanation for lottery play, most relevant to this
chapter, is that state lotteries provide some low-wealth would-be investors
with a rare asset offering some chance at winning a life-altering amount of
money. For those with few assets or who encounter other barriers—either
real or psychological—to engaging in the world of traditional financial
markets, a lottery ticket might fill the void of a ‘missing market’. If a
low- to moderate-wealth individual hopes to win a large payout—say, to
purchase a car or make a downpayment on a house—this might be the only
vehicle at his/her disposal capable of remotely reaching that goal.
The introduction of PLS products could provide an alternative to lottery
tickets that offers a higher (and certainly less negative) return on one’s
‘investment’. Survey data corroborate this quasi-investment framing by
some lottery players. A 2006 survey by the Consumer Federation of America
and the Financial Planning Association on a representative sample of more
than 1,000 US adults found that ‘21% of Americans, and 38% of those with
incomes below $25,000, think that winning the lottery represents the most
practical way for them to accumulate several hundred thousand dollars’
(CFA, 2006).
The potential appeal of PLS products must also be understood in the
context of alternative products. Emergency savers who demand liquidity
and no principal loss are usually limited to some sort of low-yielding
demand deposit. While theory might suggest that the power of compound
interest would provide strong motivations to save, for an emergency saver
whose uncertain horizon might be a few years or a few months, compounding does not offer compelling reasons to save. To be concrete, in March
2010, the average American Money Market Account (which has limitations
on withdrawals) earned an Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of 0.82 percent
(Bankrate.com, 2010). For an emergency saver with a balance of $1,500,
the monthly interest earned would be $1.05, before the payment of income
taxes. These sums—smaller than most lottery tickets—provide small savers
with scant motivation to keep their money in the bank. A PLS structure allows
one to forego these small sums, yet maintain liquidity and principal certainty,
while offering a chance to win a large amount of money or a durable good.
In addition, in a series of experimental studies, Volpp et al. (2008a,
2008b) have shown that in specific settings, subjects can respond more
strongly to stochastic incentives than to piece rates. The stochastic incentives they examine resemble the lottery portion of a PLS. In one experiment, subjects who were attempting to lose weight were eligible to be
entered in a lottery, if at a monthly weigh-in their weight met personal
weight-loss goals. Those in the lottery-incentive condition lost significantly
more weight than subjects who had nonincentivized monthly weigh-ins,
and slightly more weight than subjects who faced nonlottery incentives
(although this latter difference was not statistically significant).
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The potential appeal of PLS accounts to US issuers
Products come to market if they are attractive to both buyers and sellers.
There are a number of reasons why a PLS structure would be popular to
issuers. Here, we highlight four reasons why PLS accounts are relatively easy
to design, operate, and market:
1. Ease of marketing : Unlike an indexed-linked structure, a PLS structure
does not require the buyer to have knowledge of, or the seller to
educate the buyer about, financial markets. To the contrary, the
concept of lotteries is well understood.
2. Ease of production: A financial institution offering a PLS product can
invest the proceeds from PLS instruments into relatively simple investments, rather than employ a complex investment management
strategy.
3. Apparent transparency: One can create and maintain salient prizes (e.g.,
$100,000) by adjusting the odds over time as underlying investment
returns or the size of the pool changes.
4. Ease of providing liquidity: A prize-linked program provider can provide
easy liquidity merely by denying those making withdrawals eligibility
to win prizes.
It may be worth pausing here to ask why PLS accounts are not widespread,
given the appeal both to potential savers and to issuers. One issue is that,
although one might think that all financial institutions would be eager to
gather assets from all savers, real-world experience demonstrates this is not
true. For example, minimum mutual fund investment amounts keep people with less than $2,500 to $3,000 from opening an account in many funds
(Schneider and Tufano, 2007). In addition, as we discuss later, there are
currently significant legal and regulatory obstacles to PLS accounts in
the United States. Yet in places without such restrictions, PLS accounts
have been both widespread and quite popular.

International evidence on the appeal
of PLS accounts
In this section, we briefly review the historical evidence, broad international usage, and data from two modern versions of PLS in the United Kingdom
and South Africa.
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A brief history
PLS programs have existed since at least the 1694 ‘Million Adventure’ in
the United Kingdom (Murphy, 2005). Initially proposed to cope with debt
from the Nine Years’ War (1689–97), the Million Adventure offered
100,000 tickets at £10 each.4 A small number (2,500 of the tickets or 2.5 percent) would win prizes from £10 per year to £1,000 per year for sixteen
years. The Million Adventure was also a saving program, in that it paid
ticket holders £1 per year until 1710, or a 6.15 percent annual return.
While a single ticket in the Million Adventure was out of reach of most
citizens, tickets were also made available through syndicates to those with
small incomes. Thomas Neale, the ‘Groom Porter to their Majesties’ who
oversaw the program, commented on the success of the Million Adventure
to attract even small investors, ‘many Thousands who only have small
sums, and cannot now bring them into the Publick, [may now] engage
themselves in this Fund’ (Murphy, 2005: 231). The Million Adventure is
reported to have attracted tens of thousands of investors (of the 5 to 6
million Britons at the time), making it an unprecedented large-scale financial saving tool.
Since 1694, many similar programs that combine gambling and saving
have sprung up in many different countries all over the world. LevyUllmann, writing in 1896, surveyed PLS activity at that time. He found
that PLS, in the form of lottery bonds, ‘may be found in most of the
financial markets of Europe, and of nationalities, German, Austrian, Spanish, Greek, Italian, Swedish and Swiss’ (Levy-Ullman, 1896). Lottery bonds
are still used in some countries, for example Sweden.5

Current examples
Table 12.1 lists examples of PLS products offered internationally by various
commercial banks and governments around the world.6 Guillen and
Tschoegl (2002) survey the history and institutional details of numerous
international offerings. As described in their survey piece, commercial
banks have been offering prize-linked accounts throughout Latin America
since the 1990s. Banco Bilboa Vizcaya, a private bank in Latin America,
launched a lottery-linked product in Mexico (1996), Colombia (1997),
Venezuela (1997), and Argentina (1997). Since 1990, Spanish private
banks have offered accounts with periodic lottery prizes. Private financial
institutions also market PLS products in Germany, Indonesia, and Japan.
In Germany, since 1952, saving banks have offered accounts where depositors can allocate any new inflow into the account between saving in the
bank (which offers a traditional return) and purchases of lottery tickets

1995

1956

1956

1918

1972

1998c Crorepati (multimillionaire)
maala-maal
accountCarAmad
accountZarAmad
account

United
Arab
Emirates

Ireland

Great
Britain

Sweden

Pakistan

Pakistan

Prize Bonds

Swedish Lottery
Bonds

n/a

R$1.4 billion
(48.4 million US$)

Total balances
(US$)

SEK 40.9 billion
($5.7 billion)

Habib Bank,
PKR 47 billion
Muslim
(banks combined)
Commercial Bank, ($780 million)
Bankers Equity,
United Bank

State Bank of
PKR 170 billion
Pakistan, National ($2.8 billion)
Savings
Organization

Swedish National
Debt Office

£26.5 billion
($47 billion)

The Prize Bond
E561.5 million
Company Ltd
($701 million)
(joint venture
between An Post &
FEXCO)

Premium Savings National Savings
Bonds
and Investments

Prize Bonds

Mashreq
Millionaire
certificates

Mashreq Bank

Banco Bradesco

2003

Brazil

HiperFundo
account

Offering
institution

Country Year Name and
start structure

Table 12.1 Prize-linked saving products

PKR 10 million
(190,000 US$)

PKR 50,000,000
($833,333)

SEK 1 million
($130,000)a

2 prizes of £1,000,000
($1.79 million)a

E150,000 monthly
($187,000)a

AED 1 million
($272,000)a

Car

Maximum prize
(US$)

Cash, motorcycles,
televisions, computers,
and electronic gadgets

PKR 1000 to PKR
20,000,000

SEK 50

£50–£100,000 prizes

Weekly prize of
E20,000; 5 prizes of
E1,000; 10 prizes of
E250

Apartments

Electric appliances,
DVDs, travel, gold bars

Other prizes

n/a

Bi-monthlyb

Annually

Monthlyb

Weekly/
monthlyb

Monthly,
special
draws

Dailyb

Frequency
prize
drawings
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1978

Kenya

‘el libretón’
account

‘el libretón’
account

‘el libretón’
account

Prize-linked
savings

Lottery bonds

Mandoos Savings
Account

1996

1996

Spain

Mexico

Argentina 1997

Argentina 1997

Denmark 1972

Oman

1992

BritAma account

Indonesia 2002

Premium Bond

1950d Lottery-linked
accounts

Gewinnsparen
account

Turkey

Germany 1952

Rp 14.46 trillion
($152.6 million)

$560,000 (1998)
(approx.)

n/a

Oman
International
Bank

Danmarks
National Bank

Santander Rio

BBVA Banco
Frances

Bancomer BBVA

$220,000 (monthly)

Car

Car (daily)

100 cars

Rp. 1 billion ($10,900)

n/a

Cash prizes

E100,000 ($125,000)

RO 570 million
(approx.)
($280 million)

RO 135,000 ($54,000)

DKK 200 million
n/a
(approx.) ($34 million)

n/a

$233 million (1998)

$178 million (1998)

Banco Bilbao
n/a
Vizcaya Argentaria
(BBVA)

Bank Rakyat
Indonesia

Kenya Post Office
Savings Bank

Demirbank (now
HSBC)

Gewinnsparverein E6 million (approx.)
e.V. (and local
($7.5 million)
branches)

Monthlyb

n/a

Monthlyb

Semiannually

Daily and
monthly

Weekly

Daily and
monthly

(continued )

20 prizes of RO 20,000; Monthly,
Mercedes cars
special
drawsb

n/a

$20,000 (daily)

30 prizes of $1,000

19,000 DVDs

Cars, trips,
n/a
encyclopedias, and cash

5 prizes of Rp. 250
Semimillion; 10 prizes of Rp. annuallyb
100 million; 50 prizes of
Rp. 50 million; 500
prizes of Rp. 10 million

n/a

Gold, apartments, and
household items

Cars and cash prizes
from 4E to 10,000E
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Reserve Bank of
India

National Savings
Bank
n/a

n/a
n/a

Monthlyb

Frequency
prize
drawings

n/a

Twice every
5 yearsb

4000 prizes of Rs. 1,000; Quarterly
5000 prizes of Rs. 500

$100,000/$50,000/
$5,000/$500/$100/
$50/$20

$1,000,000 ($650,000)a

Rs. 2 million or a car
($20,000)

Other prizes

Maximum prize
(US$)

Source : Authors’ calculations based on Cole et al. (2007), exhibit 8; see text.

Notes : Jan-Emmanuel de Neve and Emily Ekins assisted in the preparation of this table.

b

The following prize-linked savings schemes post prize money as tax-exempt: United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Great Britain, Sweden, New Zealand.
Minimum holding periods vary between schemes: Brazil (7 days), Ireland (3 months), Great Britain (none), Pakistan (1 month), Germany
(1 month), Kenya (3 months), Indonesia (none), Oman (1 month), New Zealand (1 month), Sri Lanka (1 year), India (5 years).
c
Private prize-linked saving programs in Pakistan halted in 2001 after an adverse court ruling.
d
Prize-linked saving programs at Turkey’s Demirbank stopped in 1960.

a

Premium Prize
Bonds

India

1963

Ridee Rekha
certificates

Sri Lanka 1997

ANZ Banking
n/a
Group (Ministry of
Finance and Post
Office) Savings
Bank until 1990)

Bonus Bonds

1970

New
Zealand

Total balances
(US$)

Offering
institution

Country Year Name and
start structure

Table 12.1 Continued
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from the regional association of saving banks. In 1986, BRI in Indonesia, a
financial institution that specializes in microfinance lending to the poor,
introduced accounts with stochastic interest rates between 0 and 1.25
percent per month (Morduch, 1999). In 1994, the Jonan Shinkin Bank in
Japan introduced prize-linked one-year time deposits, despite Ministry of
Finance disapproval. These accounts attracted deposits worth about US$
305 million into the bank in a matter of days, attracting an additional
thirteen banks to immediately offer similar products (Guillen and
Tschoegl, 2002).
Many governments also offer some form of PLS products. Guillen and
Tschoegl (2002) report that since 1918 the Swedish government has offered bonds with coupon payments determined by lottery; in recent years,
such bonds have accounted for approximately 8 percent of the Swedish
government’s debt. Outside of Europe, government entities in Kenya and
Pakistan, among others, have also offered such products. Later, we discuss
one long-lived government program in the United Kingdom.

United Kingdom Premium Bonds
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced the invention of Premium
Savings Bonds in April 1956, to encourage saving after World War II.
Despite criticism from both parties in the House of Commons and religious
groups, sales launched on November 1, 1956 in Trafalgar Square, with the
byline ‘Savings with a Thrill!’ Macmillan reasoned that ‘[Premium Bonds]
will appeal to those who are not attracted by the rewards of interest, but do
respond to the incentives of fortune’ (NSAI, 2006: 1, 4). Consumer response
proved him quite right, with £5 million (near £84 million in 2005 pounds)
purchased on the first day. In 1956, the top prize was £1,000 or about
£16,729.30 in 2005 pounds (NSAI, 2010a). The bonds continue to be popular and have been immortalized in popular British culture, with one rocker’s
lyrics thanking the computer that picks the winners: ‘Good old Ernie; he
coughed up a tenner on a Premium Bond win’ (Collecting-Tull.com, 2010).
The Premium Bond program is administered by National Savings and
Investments (NSAI), an Executive Agency of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (NSAI is comparable to the US Department of Public Debt, which is
part of the US Treasury). As described on the NSAI website, ‘Instead of
paying interest, bonds are entered into monthly prize drawings . . . When
someone invests in Premium Bonds they are allocated a series of numbers,
one for each £1 invested. The minimum purchase is £100 (or £50 when you
buy by monthly standing order), which provides 100 Bond numbers and,
therefore, 100 chances of winning a prize’ (NSAI, 2010b). An individual
investor can hold up to £30,000 in Premium Bonds. The monthly drawings
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include the chance at a £1 million jackpot prize as well as lower-tier prizes
ranging from £25 to £100,000. Note that this structure of a jackpot prize
plus lower-tier offerings is similar to the common structure of US state
lottery jackpot games. Each month’s prize fund is equal to one month’s
interest on the total value of all eligible bonds. The February 2010 annual
prize fund interest rate was 1.50 percent. The interest rate used to calculate
the prize fund, the number of jackpots, the share of prize fund allocated to
each prize band, and the odds of winning are all variable. These bonds can
be purchased by UK residents over the age of 16 for themselves or for their
children or grandchildren. Premium Bond winnings are exempt from UK
Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax.
Official figures report that there are 23 million bondholders holding £26
billion worth of Premium Bonds nationwide. The popularity of these bonds
has soared in recent decades, with the amount invested rising from £4
billion in 1994 to £40 billion in 2008 (NSAI, 2010b). Tufano (2008) examines aggregate predictors of per capita Premium Bond sales considering
the prize rate, top prize, and annual stock returns, among other aggregate
series. The prize rate can be considered analogous to a bond yield, capturing information about the number and size of various prizes. Tufano notes
that the prize rate has generally been lower than the rate paid on comparable government bonds, which (assuming that investors know this) suggests
that Premium Bond investors are willing to forgo return to purchase this
type of prize-linked instrument. His multivariate regression analysis finds
that annual net sales are positively correlated with the size of the largest
prize offered, the prize rate spread (prize rate less gilt rate), and annual
stock returns. These correlated movements potentially suggest that Premium Bonds offer both an investment value (as demand moves positively
with prize rate spread) and gambling consumption value (as demand
increases with the size of the largest prize, conditional on prize rate).7
The positive correlation with annual stock returns might suggest that
these are not considered substitute products or that they are purchased
by different sets of investors.
The United Kingdom’s Family Resource Survey (FRS) provides information about who is investing in Premium Bonds: the FRS 2004–5 Annual
Report tabulates information about the percent of households with different types of saving accounts (DWPUK, 2010). Among two-adult households
without children (sample size of 9,178), 96 percent have any type of
account; 30 percent have a Premium Bond account, 26 percent have
stock holdings, and 5 percent have National Savings bonds. Among twoadult households with children (sample size of 5,714), 97 percent have any
type of account; 19 percent have a Premium Bond account, 22 percent
have stock holdings, and 1 percent have a National Savings bond. Among
one-adult families with children (sample size of 2,050), 93 percent have any
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Table 12.2 Families holding UK Premium Bonds by income quintiles (%)
Income quintiles

All families

Families with any type of account

All families Married Single All families

Married

Single

1

8.8

21.1

6.6

10.4

22.8

8.0

2

13.2

24.3

10.6

14.4

25.1

11.9

3

18.1

24.4

10.6

19.0

25.1

11.5

4

23.4

26.9

13.0

24.0

27.4

13.9

5

31.1

36.3

19.4

31.7

37.0

20.0

33,182

16,005

17,177

30,992

15,464

15,528

Number of observations

Notes: Families with any type of account are defined as those who hold at least one type of
account or investment. Income quintiles represent quintiles of total family income. The
quintiles are calculated separately over samples of all families, married couples, and single
adults. Tabulations are weighted to be representative of the UK population.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DWPUK (2010); see text.

type of account; 6 percent have a Premium Bond account, 5 percent have
stock holdings, and 1 percent have National Savings Bonds.
Our tabulations of the 2004–5 FRS data show that Premium Bonds are
held by households across the income distribution. Nineteen percent of
families hold Premium Bonds; the figure is 27 percent among families
headed by a married couple, and 12 percent among single-headed families.
Tabulations by income quintiles, reported in Table 12.2, reveal that the
likelihood of holding Premium Bonds increases with income, as is typical of
investments more generally. These bonds might thus be considered ‘normal’ goods. Still, low-income households participate in this market, with
nearly 9 percent of households in the lowest income quintile holding
Premium Bonds and 13 percent in the second quintile. The general pattern of participation by income group is maintained if we consider only
households with any type of account.
We can get a sense of the relative appeal of Premium Bonds by income
group, by analyzing the fraction of that group that owns the product
relative to the fraction owning the most popular product for that
group. For example, among households making £200–£300 weekly, the
most popular saving product is a society account, with 39 percent of households holding this account. In this same income group, 18 percent hold
Premium Bonds, so that the fraction holding Premium Bonds scaled by the
fraction holding the most common account type is 46 percent. Figure 12.1
shows this scaled holding measure: it indicates that Premium Bonds’ relative appeal seems strongest among lower-income households, with some
increase in relative appeal among higher-income households. The latter
may reflect the fact that the bonds’ winnings are exempt from taxation.
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Figure 12.1 Breadth of Premium Bond ownership in the UK from 2005 to 2006
Notes: This figure shows the fraction of British households holding Premium Bonds
as a function of weekly household income. It also shows this share scaled by the most
widely held asset account (excluding transaction accounts) held by that income
category. The survey covers a sample of 28,029 British households.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data taken from DWPUK (2010) Family
Resources Survey 2005–6 (Table 5.8).

First National Bank of South Africa’s
Million-a-Month Account
Next, we review another example of a PLS account: the South African bank
First National Bank’s Million-a-Month Account (MaMA). This provides a
nice contrasting example to the UK program described earlier for two
reasons: first, the MaMAs constitute a privately run PLS program. Second,
whereas the government-run UK Premium Bond program is long-lived, the
MaMAs were short-lived, owing to legal and regulatory barriers.8
First National Bank (FNB), one of the four largest retail banks in
the South African market, introduced its MaMA in 2005. The MaMA was
a no-fee saving account which paid a nominal interest rate (0.25 percent)
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and rewarded savers with one prize entry for every 100 rand invested.9 Prize
drawings were held monthly and at each drawing, 114 prizes were awarded,
ranging in value from 1 million rand to 1,000 rand. The product was
structured as a thirty-two-day notice account, a common South African
account form akin to a certificate of deposit in that the account holder
had to give thirty-two days’ notice prior to withdrawing his/her funds from
the program.
A bit of background on the South African financial services sector is
useful in understanding this product. The majority (56 percent) of black
South Africans are unbanked versus 7 percent of white South Africans.
Nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of low-income South Africans were
unbanked. In 2003, banks and the government entered into the Financial
Sector Charter, in which banks committed to try to increase the fraction of
low income banked South Africans from 28 to 80 percent. Banks expanded
distribution outlets, designed low-fee small balance products, and created
marketing campaigns to reach out to the unbanked.
FNB executives had studied the UK Premium Bond experience and
visited other countries where PLS programs were in place. While there
were no PLS programs in South Africa, they reasoned that a program of this
sort would be successful in the country, based on the widespread popularity
of gaming and the national lottery in the country:
In 2003, the national lottery had 99% consumer awareness and 72% of the population regularly entered to win the lottery’s 20 to 30 million rand jackpot. In 2003,
players purchased 3,772 million rand in tickets and the lottery board awarded 2,119
million rand in prizes to 31 million winners. Participation in the lottery was fairly
evenly distributed across demographic groups, with little difference by education,
race, income, gender, or education. Lower-income players spent less in absolute
terms on the lottery than high-income players, though they spent a larger proportion of income. Among those with less than 800 rand in disposable monthly income,
monthly lottery expenditures averaged 33.40 rand, about 8.5% of disposable income. Among those with more than 12,000 rand in monthly disposable income,
lottery expenditures were much higher, at 126 rand, but as a percent of income
much lower, at just 0.8% (Cole et al., 2007: 7).

The program ran from January 2005 through March 2008. During this
time, the bank used print and television advertising and in-branch promotion to sell the product. By March 2008, FNB had opened over 1.1 million
accounts and collected 1.4 billion rand in deposits (FDIC, 2009). Executives report that about 12 percent of the accounts were to KYC (‘know your
customer’)-exempt accounts, a marker for the unbanked. They estimated
that they opened accounts for 7.1 percent of all banked South Africans and
brought 1.1 percent of the unbanked into the banking system.
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The success of the system likely also brought about its ultimate closure, as
the South African Lottery Board sued to have the program closed as an
illegal lottery. Although the program no longer operates, the bank received
ongoing benefits from the MaMA program. At the time the program was
shut by the government, FNB offered to return monies to savers or they
could elect to roll the funds into a more traditional thirty-two-day notice
account. Fourteen months after the program was shuttered, the bank
continued to maintain 53 percent of the accounts and 83 percent of the
balances.

Recent PLS demonstration projects in
the United States
Credit unions have been on the forefront of launching PLS products in the
United States. Working with the nonprofit Doorways to Dreams (D2D)
Fund and other partners, credit unions have implemented two demonstration projects designed to test the feasibility and popularity of PLS accounts
among low- and moderate-income populations.10

Centra credit union project in Indiana
In October 2006, with funding support from the Filene Research Institute
and Affinity Plus Federal Credit Union, D2D assisted the Indiana-based
Centra Credit Union in a launch of ‘Super Savings’, a prize-based saving
product. In order to comply with relevant law (reviewed later), this product
was structured as a sweepstake with ‘no purchase required’. In January
2009, assisted by the D2D Fund, the Filene Research Institute, the Center
for Financial Services Innovation, and the Michigan Credit Union League,
eight credit unions launched a PLS product called ‘Save to Win’.
As part of the Centra Credit Union demonstration, a pre-pilot marketing
survey was administered to gauge potential consumer interest in a PLS
product. This survey was completed by 547 intercepted Wal-Mart customers
in Clarksville, Indiana in November and December 2006. Clarksville is in
Clark County, Indiana, which has a population of 103,569. According to US
census figures, median household income in the county is $41,719 (compared to $48,451 nationally). The survey’s principal question was ‘Would
you be interested in a savings account that awarded chances to win prizes
based on the amount of money you save? The account would also have no
fees, no minimum balance, and still earn interest.’ The survey sought to
gauge local interest in the product. While neither nationally representative
nor random, the demographic correlates of expressed interest are
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potentially revealing about who might take up PLS products, should they
be offered in the United States.
Among all respondents who completed the pre-pilot survey, 58 percent
reported interest in the described PLS product, 26 percent reported not
being interested, and 16 percent responded that they did not know.
In multivariate analysis, including traditional demographic information,
Tufano et al. (2008) find that expressed preference was stronger among
people who claimed not to have regular saving plans, defined as those who
either stated that they did not save or merely saved if they happened to have
money that they had not spent that month. Compared to individuals or
households with a saving plan, a nonsaver was 70 percent more likely to
show interest in the PLS product. PLS demand was also strongest with
people with almost no savings ($1–$2,000), relative to those with no savings
whatsoever or those with more. They also found that optimism, measured
by the belief that one’s financial well-being will improve over the next five
years, was a positive determinant of interest in PLS accounts. Finally, survey
participants reporting spending of $100 or more in lottery games in the
past six months were twice as interested as others.
In terms of consumer take-up, Centra opened over 1,300 Super Savings
accounts and amassed over $500,000 in deposits within three months of
launch, even with limited marketing. This represented 1.3 percent of its
member base in early 2007. Additionally, most customers maintained their
deposit balances in the product following the first three months of the launch.
As a small pilot run by a single credit union, Centra’s program prize offerings
were quite small, which likely limited its ultimate success.11 Additional experimental research is needed to ascertain how the design of PLS products,
including the size of the top prize, affects consumer interest and take-up.12

Save to Win demonstration project in Michigan
Another PLS demonstration project was launched in 2009 in Michigan.
The ‘Save to Win’ demonstration was run as a saving promotion in eight
participating credit unions in the state of Michigan from late January 2009
to end December 2009. This demonstration was legally permissible under a
unique provision in Michigan law that permits credit unions in the state to
offer ‘savings promotion raffles’, with only those who save eligible to win
prizes (in contrast to a sweepstake). The Save to Win project enabled
several credit unions to join forces in order to offer a PLS product with a
headline-grabbing $100,000 grand prize, in contrast to the small-scale issue
faced by the Centra Credit Union experience described earlier.
At any time during 2009, members of participating credit unions could
open a qualifying share certificate account to enter the saving raffle. This
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certificate was a twelve-month time deposit and required only $25 to open.
Deposits were unlimited, but the number of entries in the raffle was capped
at ten per month. The amount of interest paid on these certificates varied
by credit union, but in 2009, ranged from one to 1.5 percent. Monthly
prizes ranged in value from $15 to $400, and the number of prizes varied by
month. The grand prize of $100,000 was awarded in early 2010. One
withdrawal was allowed during the twelve-month period, and standard
certificate early-withdrawal fees applied. However, unlike most CDs, savers
could add money to their certificates over time.
In the eleven months in which Save to Win operated, the participating
credit unions opened 11,600 accounts and generated over $8.6 million in
deposits. To put this in context, the credit unions are located in some of
the more economically depressed parts of the Mid-West. In locations such
as Flint and Detroit, the demise of the auto industry has led to high
unemployment and economic hardship. In terms of the rate of saving
and the cost of delivery, this compares favorably to other efforts to foster
new savers and new saving, such as Individual Development Account (IDA)
matched saving programs.13
Each Save to Win certificate holder was also invited to complete a voluntary survey when he or she opened an account. By end December 2009,
over half of certificate holders, some 6,027 credit union members, had
completed this survey. Results show that certificates have been opened
among credit union members of all ages, income levels, and past saving
behavior. In particular, 56 percent of Save to Win certificate holders reported they had not saved money regularly before opening the Save to Win
account; 39 percent reported financial assets (excluding home equity) of
$5,000 or less; 59 percent reported spending money on the lottery in the
last six months; 68 percent reported household income of less than
$60,000; and 44 percent reported household income under $40,000.
The survey data from the Save to Win demonstration do not allow us to
determine how effective the program was in generating new saving. Nonetheless, the apparent appeal of the PLS products offered in the Centra and
Save to Win demonstrations, especially among people who claimed to have
no other regular saving plans, suggest that a PLS product holds appeal for
demographic groups that tend to have low levels of formal saving.

Legal barriers to PLS programs in the United States14
As defined by the National Bank Act, there are three essential components
of a lottery: (a) the offering of a prize; (b) the awarding of the prize by
chance; and (c) consideration (i.e., money or other thing of value advanced in exchange for the opportunity to win the prize). If PLS programs
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are deemed lotteries, they are shut down almost entirely. This legal prohibition arises from state anti-lottery laws, as well as state and federal banking
regulations. The state anti-lottery laws prohibit private lotteries, in part to
enable states to maintain a monopoly over these activities so as not to
jeopardize the funds raised by lottery programs. The latter set of laws, for
example, the National Bank Act, prohibit federally chartered banks and
thrifts (regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or
Office of Thrift Supervision, respectively) from participating in lotteries
to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system.15
The two US experiments cited earlier were able to exploit two legal
loopholes. The Centra offering was structured as a sweepstake, not a
lottery. People did not need to save to enter, but rather could mail in a
card in lieu of saving. This explicit lack of ‘consideration’ supports a variety
of bank promotions that use sweepstakes, such as JPMorgan Chase’s ‘Double your Deposit’ promotion offered in early 2009, and the Maryland Saves’
‘Roll in the Dough’ saving campaign offered in early 2010 (FDIC, 2009).
Sweepstake solutions permit nonsavers to win, add operational complexity
to the program, and tend to be used primarily for ad hoc marketing
campaigns. The Save to Win program rests on a different and unique state
law. Section 411 of the Michigan Credit Union Act allows state-charted
credit unions to employ ‘savings promotions raffles’ defined as ‘raffle(s)
conducted by a domestic credit union where the sole consideration required for a chance of winning designated prizes is the deposit of at least a
specified amount of money in a saving account or other saving program
offered by the domestic credit union’.16 Even if this carve-out were extended to other states, the ability to scale these programs would be limited.
Credit union charters require that their membership be limited to a certain
designated population, such as people affiliated with specific employers or
organizations, or residing in defined geographic areas. These limits tend to
preclude scale economics, making the prize structure less desirable to
would-be participants. Running PLS through a consortium of credit unions, as is the case with Save to Win, helps to generate a larger deposit base.
However, there would be inevitable coordination costs. In mid-2010, two
additional states passed laws similar to Michigan’s.

State-run PLS programs?
PLS products could be offered in the United States by the federal government (a federal Premium Bond) or by state governments. Given the lack of
federal policy interest in the first option, we focus on state alternatives.
Shut down in the late nineteenth century as a result of fraud, and later
revived by the State of New Hampshire in 1964, state lotteries have had a
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consistent mandate: to generate state revenue (Coughlin et al., 2006). But
this lottery mandate may be at odds with the limited revenue stream a state
lottery-based PLS product is likely to produce. Beyond this fact, in most
cases lottery commissions are required to pay out in prizes a certain fraction
of sales proceeds. In a PLS program, if deposits or bond purchases were to
be counted as gross sales, it would be impossible to pay out in prizes the
mandated portion of sales and still guarantee depositors that they will
receive back their full principal investment. Only some of the earnings
from a PLS pool could be paid out, with the remainder available for the
payment of expenses and to deliver revenue to the state.
A real example highlights other legal constraints on a state-run program.
The state of Maryland, in 1975, authorized a premium saving bond program modeled on the British Premium Bond, to be administered by the
state lottery agency. Principal investments would be guaranteed and redeemable at any time, and bondholders would be eligible not for regular
interest, but for what Maryland officials called a ‘random interest award’
(Phillips, 1975). The size of a person’s investment would determine the
number of entries in the drawing for a large monetary prize. Yet after the
initial feasibility study, legal opinion warned that it was in essence a
‘cloaked lottery’ and ‘would be subject to existing lottery laws’. These
included limitations on marketing, accepting bond investments from anyone outside of Maryland, and using banks to sell the bonds. Furthermore,
the product would need to be sold through lottery agents who were used to
receiving a commission of roughly 5 percent on all lottery sales (Phillips,
1975). In short, even when defined as a lottery and run through the lottery
agency, other structural considerations made the product not viable at that
time.
Even if PLS is a sensible economic structure, existing US laws and
regulations would likely need to be changed to permit issues, whether
private or public. The South African MaMA provides reason to pause:
when the product became popular, the South African Lottery Board
brought suit against the bank to cease the offering of this ‘illegal lottery’,
and the South African Supreme Court ruled in the Boards’ favor. While the
case has no direct precedent for US laws, the structure of the Court’s
arguments shows how laws similar to those in the United States could be
applied to shut down a private PLS program.

Conclusion
Although no formal evaluation of US-based PLS exists, several lessons are
evident. First, the product has been offered for more than three centuries,
continuously in some jurisdictions for over five decades. From an operational
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point of view, this is a well-tested product. Second, the product’s appeal
is fairly widespread, and in particular it seems to be of interest to those
who might otherwise not be able to use (or be interested in using) more
standard products. Third, without a change in laws and regulations, adoption of this product will be fairly limited.
The good news–bad news of PLS underscores the importance of new and
rigorous research on this saving structure. One consideration we have not
discussed thus far is what effect, if any, the availability of PLS products
might have on traditional lottery demand. More fundamentally, the key
question yet to be answered is whether the availability of PLS would generate new savers and new saving, and if so by whom. Future research should
address this question. In order to answer the question of what impact PLS
products have on household saving behavior, researchers would need
information on saving outcomes for individuals who were given access to
a PLS product and a comparable set of individuals who were not. Ideally,
this would be investigated through an experimental research design, allowing researchers to determine whether it is the prize-linked nature of the
product that is driving take-up and saving, as opposed to, for example,
associated marketing efforts. Moreover, crucially for policy analysts, such a
design, coupled with detailed data about individuals in both groups, would
allow investigators to determine whether new PLS accounts represent new
saving at the individual or household level, and whether legal changes to
allow wider adoption of PLS products are consistent with good public
policy.
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See Tufano and Schneider (2008) for an overview of existing policies aimed at
promoting savings among low and moderate savers in the United States.
This team of authors has attempted multiple projects designed to investigate
whether prize-linked savings products generate new and increased levels of saving, as opposed to shifting assets from other vehicles. We have yet to implement a
randomized design experiment, but we continue to seek research opportunities.
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Among those in the lowest income third of the NORC data—defined by having
household income of less than $30,400 in 2005 dollars—reported annual lottery
expenditures averaged $164. We can make an imperfect comparison of lottery
gambling and savings by low-income individuals by comparing these numbers to
the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Among individuals in the SCF with less than a high school degree, median assets
in savings and checking accounts total $200 (in year 2005 dollars); likewise for
median liquid assets. The SCF data suggest that this amount is comparable to
median liquid assets and median savings and checking assets, both amounting to
$200 for this income group.
O’Donoghue et al. (2004) report a consistent inflation series from 1750 through
2003. Using this period (and assuming no inflation prior to 1750), the ticket
would have cost over £1,400 in 2003 pounds.
For an economic analysis of this program, see Green and Rydqvist (1997).
This table, taken from Cole et al. (2007), was collected through literature reviews, web searches, and conversations with practitioners. It is unlikely to be
complete, as some of these programs are not widely advertised.
By way of comparison, Kearney’s analysis (2005) of demand for US state lottery
products, estimated at the level of game and week, similarly finds that lottery
sales are positively driven by expected return—suggesting an investment motive
and evaluation—as well as nonpecuniary characteristics, including the nominal
top prize, numbers of digits chosen, and age of the game.
Much of this section is drawn from Cole et al. (2007).
The rand is the South African currency. At the time of writing, 1 rand was worth
about 0.14 US dollars.
Co-author of this chapter, Peter Tufano, is Chairman and Co-founder of the D2D
fund. The mission of D2D is to expand access to financial services, especially
asset-building opportunities, for low-income families by creating, testing, and
deploying innovative financial products and services.
Both Tufano (2008) and Lobe and Holzl (2007) demonstrate that large prizes
are strongly related to sales of Premium Bonds.
This is a feature that we have proposed testing in random design field experiments. As mentioned earlier, we have yet to successfully implement such an
experimental design in the field. Guryan and Kearney are currently developing
a laboratory experiment to be conducted at the Experimental Laboratory in the
Department of Economics at the University of Maryland that would test this
concept.
For instance, over four years, 2,364 participants in the landmark American
Dream Demonstration (ADD) IDA program accumulated $1.25 MM in savings
(Schreiner et al., 2002).
Andrea Ryan contributed to this section of this chapter. It draws upon work done
by Angela Seensun Kang, Anooshree C. Sinha, and Howell Jackson of Harvard
Law School, from the insights of Jackson and Tufano’s students in their JD-MBA
course on consumer finance, especially Daniel Preysman, and from work done
by D2D Fund and its legal advisors. Readers should not rely on this document for
legal advice, as the law in this area is quite complex.
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See 12 U.S.C. } 25a (2008).
See Mich. Comp. Laws } 490.411 (2008).
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